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In this paper we assess the stability of open economy backward-
looking Phillips curves estimated over two diﬀerent exchange rate regimes.
The pseudo-data employed in our econometric exercise come from the
simulation of a New-Keynesian hybrid model suited for performing
monetary policy analysis. Two main results arise: i) in most of the
simulated scenarios the estimated reduced-form Phillips curves turn
out to be unstable. However, if the structural new-keynesian model
is predominantly - even if not fully - backward-looking, the estimated
reduced-form parameters are stable; ii) the Chow-breakpoint test tends
to underestimate the importance of regime-shifts in small samples.
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Since the publication of the seminal paper by Lucas [1976], many researchers
have explicitly embedded forward-looking expectations in their policy mod-
els. One of the ﬁelds that has been intensely aﬀected by this push towards
microfoundation is the monetary one (e.g. Woodford [2003]). Interestingly, a
diﬀerent strand of this literature (e.g. Rudebusch and Svensson [1999,2002],
Ball [1999,2000]) has relied on ad-hoc backward-looking frameworks. In fact,
backward-looking models tend to oﬀer a quite good ﬁt of the data. More-
over, their impulse responses closely resemble those stemming from struc-
tural VARs, an issue that pure forward-looking models have some troubles
in dealing with (Estrella and Fuhrer [2002]).
Evidently, backward-looking models are aﬀected by the Lucas [1976]
critique. The theoretical argument goes as follows. If agents are forward-
looking they will adjust their expectations once a policy change is credibly
announced. As a consequence, reduced-form coeﬃcients will be theoreti-
cally unstable under a change in the policy regime. Then, a policy analysis
performed with reduced-form coeﬃcients may be severely mis-leading. This
is true in principle: But how important this change is from a quantitative
perspective?
While some researchers have undertaken empirical eﬀorts to answer this
question in a closed-economy set-up (e.g. Lindè [2001], Estrella and Fuhrer
[2003], Rudebusch [2003]), to the best of our knowledge the only contribution
dealing with an open-economy framework dates back to Taylor [1989]. This
is somewhat surprising, given the incresing openess in terms of trade and
ﬂows of resources conveyed in the international ﬁnancial markets observed
in several countries in the last decades (Lane [2001]).1
The aim of this paper is that of ’updating’ Taylor [1989]’s contribu-
tion. Taylor [1989] employs an estimated macro-model for simulating the
shift from a ’ﬁxed’ to a ’ﬂexible’ nominal exchange rate in some industrial-
1Here we refer to contributions that are very closely related to our object of investi-
gation, i.e. the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique for backward-looking monetary
policy models. In general, the quantitative importance of the Lucas critique has been
subject to wide attention since 1976. For a survey in this sense, see Ericsson and Irons
[1995].
2ized countries. Once done so, he estimates with such simulated data some
reduced-form schedules (mainly demand and supply curves), and compares
the estimated parameters under the ﬁrst regime to those estimated under
the second one. Taylor [1989] observes that the diﬀerences in magnitude
between those parameters are not really large, and concludes that the Lucas
critique does not ﬁnd a large support in the data. Notice that, in performing
his analysis, Taylor [1989] does not use any statistical tool for assessing the
diﬀerences among the estimated parameters.
We reﬁne the contribution by Taylor [1989] along two main dimensions.
First, we employ a modern new-Keynesian DSGE open economy monetary
policy model in the spirit of the one proposed by Svensson [2000]. In this
model, the monetary policy makers manage the short-term interest rate to
minimize a penalty function representing the loss the Society bears because
of the ﬂuctuations of the main economic macro-variables. This minimization
problem is complicated by the complex transmission mechanism present in
the economy. We employ this ’targeting-rule’ framework a la Svensson [1999]
because it represents the workhorse approach in modern monetary policy
analysis. As a second diﬀerence with respect to Taylor [1989], to evalutate
t h ei m p a c to ft h er e g i m es h i f to nt h er e d u c e df o r mc o e ﬃcients we rely on a
statistical tool, i.e. the popular Chow [1960] breakpoint test.
The reduced-form schedules we concentrate on are two diﬀerent versions
of the Phillips curve. We do so to contribute to the recent discussion on inﬂa-
tion dynamics and its formalization, discussion that has led some authors to
prefer the ’accelerationist’ version of the Phillips curve (e.g. Mankiw [2001],
Estrella and Fuhrer [2002]) over the micro-founded, expectations-equipped
new-Keynesian schedule (e.g. Woodford [2003]). Since the former is proba-
bly a reduced-form schedule capturing dynamics stemming from a diﬀerent
structural model, it is interesting to gauge the stability of such curve once
a policy shift is implemented.
Our results highlight the relationship existing between the instability
of our estimated reduced-form Phillips curves and the relative importance
of agents’ forward-looking expectations in the structural model at hand.
Furthermore, we provide evidence against the power of the Chow-breakpoint
test in small samples, so oﬀering a possible explanation for the commonly
3rejected empirical relevance of the Lucas critique under a regime shift.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the small macro
model we employ to produce the simulated time-series of interest. Section
3 contains an explanation of the steps we implement to perform our econo-
metric exercise. In Section 4 we present our ﬁndings, whose robustness is
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes, and References follow.
2 A simple open-economy macro-model
The open-economy framework we employ is basically the one put forward
by Svensson [2000]. In this set-up, the paths of the domestic inﬂation rate
and the output gap are deﬁned as follows:
πt+1 = µπEtπt+2 +( 1− µπ)πt + αyyt + αqEtqt+1 + ut+1 (1)
yt+1 = µyEtyt+2 +( 1− µy)yt − βr(it − Etπt+1)+βqqt + βyy∗
t + vt+1 (2)
where πt is the annualized quarterly inﬂation, yt is the output gap (i.e.
the log-diﬀerence between the real GDP and a measure of potential out-
put), qt is the real exchange rate, it is the short-term nominal interest rate
controlled by the Central Bank, ut and vt are iid processes with zero mean
and standard deviations σu and σv,a n dy∗
t is the foreign output gap (as, in
general, starred variables refer to foreign variables).
Equation (1) is an open economy version of a stochastic hybrid Phillips
curve, in which the inﬂation rate is pre-determined one period, it is endoge-
nously inertial (as in Christiano et al [2005]), it takes into account the eﬀect
of expected costs of imported intermediate inputs via the real exchange rate
ﬂuctuations, and it allows inﬂation to be hit by a ’cost push shock’ ut+1.2
Equation (2) deﬁnes the path of the output gap, which is caused by ex-
pectations on future output gap’s realizations as well as past values (the
latter ﬁnding their rationale in e.g. habit formation, as in Fuhrer [2000]),
the ex-ante real interest rate, the real exchange rate (which approximates
2In this model an increase of the nominal/real exchange rate stands for depreciation.
4the increased demand for domestic goods driven by exchange rate deprecia-
tion) and the foreign output gap, which captures the increased demand for
domestic goods due to the expansions of the foreign business cycle.3 Notice
that equations (1) and (2) allows for explicit lags in the transmission mech-
anism; in fact, it is hard to derive these lags from micro-foundations, but
they are quite useful to match the gradual response of inﬂation and output
to monetary policy shocks observed in the data (Christiano et al [2005]).
The evolution of the nominal exchange rate st is described by the fol-
lowing hybrid stochastic version of the uncovered interest parity (UIP) con-
dition:
it = i∗
t + µsEtst+1 +( 1− µs)st−1 − st + ϕt (3)
where the risk-premium ϕt is shaped as an AR(1) process with root ρψ
and a zero-mean stochastic error ψt whose standard deviation is identiﬁed
by σψ.4 We capture backward-looking exchange-rate expectations (Frankel
and Froot [1987]) by allowing for the parameter µs to assume a value smaller
than 1; clearly, when µs =1we go back to the textbook UIP condition.
As indicated above, one of the arguments (potentially) of interest for the
central banker is the CPI inﬂation rate πCPI
t , which is deﬁned as
πCPI
t =( 1− χ)πt + χπM
t (4)
where χ is the weight of imported goods in the aggregate consumption
basket, and πM
t stands for imported inﬂation. Following Leitemo and Söder-
ström [2005], we deﬁne the imported price level pM
t as follows:
pM
t =( 1− θ)pM
t−1 + θ(p∗
t + st) (5)
3Note that the steady state value of the real exchange rate qt in this model is equal to
zero, hence the model is consistent with the natural rate hypothesis. The lagged impact
of the real exchange rate on the domestic output gap is due to our willingness of avoiding
the contemporaneous presence of the current and the expected domestic policy rate in the
IS equation, which would render the regulator problem non-standard.
4We shape the stochastic component ϕt as an AR(1) process to capture the commonly
observed persistence of the risk-premium, as in Svensson [2000], and Leitemo and Söder-
ström [2005].
5Importantly, the parameter θ allows for the possibility of deviating from
the law of one price in the short-run. In fact, if 0 ≤ θ<1, then the imported
price level does not immediately fully adjust after a shock has hit the foreign
inﬂation rate or the nominal exchange rate. This price stickiness is intended
to capture the imperfection of the exchange rate pass-through observed in
the real world, imperfection that tend to be much less important in the long
run, as shown in Campa and Goldberg [2002].
Since the real exchange rate qt is deﬁned as
qt = st + p∗
t − pt (6)
equations (4), (5), and (6) suggest the following link between real ex-
change rate and CPI inﬂation:
πCPI
t =( 1− χ)πt + χ[(1 − θ)πM
t−1 + θ(πt + ∆qt)] (7)
which makes it clear that (the change of) the real exchange rate exerts
an impact over CPI inﬂation.
As far as the Rest-Of-the-World (ROW henceforth) is concerned, in this
framework the monetary authorities follow a Taylor rule, i.e.
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y are the coeﬃcients respectively associated to foreign
inﬂation and foreign output gap, ρi∗ is the interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient,
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t is a zero-mean white noise process with variance σ∗
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62.1 Optimal monetary policy
The monetary authorities’ behavior closes the model. We aim at simulat-
ing the shift from a ’controlled exchange rate regime’ to a ’ﬂexible’ one, a
change implemented by several countries in the last decades (Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ [2004]). In our framework, the diﬀerent monetary policy regimes are
identiﬁed by diﬀerent penalty functions. In particular, under the ’controlled
exchange rate regime’ the penalty function reads as follows:5
E(Lt)=λ∆sVa r(∆st)+λ∆iVa r(∆it) (11)
where Va r(∆st) stands for the volatiliy of the nominal exchange rate in ﬁrst
diﬀerences, while the interest rate smoothing argument Va r(∆it) is mainly
introduced to avoid counterfactual extreme ﬂuctuations of the short-term
nominal interest rate.6 By contrast, the ’ﬂe x i b l e ’e x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei s
formalized by allowing for a ’CPI inﬂation targeting’, i.e.
E(Lt)=λπCPIVa r(πCPI
t )+λyVa r(yt)+λ∆iVa r(∆it) (12)
where Va r(πCPI
t ) captures the concern the monetary authorities have for
CPI inﬂation ﬂuctuations, while the weight λy measures the relative impor-
tance of business-cycle ﬂuctuations in the penalty function.
The monetary authorities aim at minimizing either (11) or (12) sub-
ject to the constraints (1)-(10). We assume that the central bank con-
ducts monetary policy under discretion, an assumption supported by the
analysis by Bernanke and Mishkin [1997]. Söderlind [1999] shows that
the solution of the optimal control problem links the vector of state vari-
ables x1t =
£





¤0 to the policy rate it,i . e .













,w h e r exi is one of the n arguments targeted by the monetary
authorities. As shown by Rudebusch and Svensson [1999], the conditional expectation
presented here tends to the unconditional expectation discussed in the text as δ 1.I n
this study, we ﬁx the discount factor δ to be equal to .99, a standard choice given the
quarterly frequency assumed for our model.
6Discussions on some possible alternative ways of formalizing a ’controlled’ exchange
rate regime and on some technicalities on the optimal-control problem solved by the central
bank are oﬀered in the Technical Appendix of this paper available upon request.
7it = e fi(λi
s)x1t. The (1x9) vector e fi(λi
s) is the numerically-computed solu-
tion of the optimal control problem solved by the monetary policy author-
ities having the vector of preferences λi
s,w i t hi indicating either ’regime1’
[identiﬁed by the penalty function (11)] or ’regime2’ [identiﬁed by (12)].
2.2 Model parameterization
Our ’in-lab’ exercise allows us to perfectly identify the source of the insta-
bility of the reduced-form Phillips curves (if any). Evidently, to perform an
interesting exercise from a policy perspective we need a sensible parameteri-
zation of the structural model we employ. The benchmark parameterization
used in our exercise is largely borrowed from the existing literature. The
domestic economy is almost fully parameterized on the basis of the contribu-
tions by Svensson [2000] and Leitemo and Söderström [2005].7 In particular,
we think of µπ = .5 and µπ = .3 as plausible benchmark values for the
degrees of ’forwardness’ related to - respectively - the Phillips curve and the
IS schedule. However, given the huge uncertainty surrounding such values,
we also investigate the dynamics stemming from other two diﬀerent models
identiﬁed by [µπ,µ y]=[ .3,.1] and [µπ,µ y]=[ .8,.8]. As far as the degree of
forwardness of the UIP condition is concerned, we set µs = .7 to acknowl-
edge to the nominal exchange rate its feature of ’forward-looking determined
asset price’ (Svensson [2000]). We set the exchange rate pass-through coef-
ﬁcient θ = .5 to be in line with the indications coming from the empirical
work by Campa and Goldberg [2002]. We parameterize the foreign economy
as in Svensson [2000], the sole exception being the interest rate smoothing
parameter ρi∗ that we set to .75, in line with the point-estimate by Clarida
et al [2000] for the US. All the parameters identifying our benchmark model
are collected in Table 1.
To close the model, the two diﬀerent regimes we simulate are identiﬁed
by the following central bank’s sets of preferences: λ∆s =1 ,λ ∆i = .2 for the
’controlled nominal exchange rate volatility’ regime (Loss function [11]) vs.
λπCPI =1 ,λ y = .5,λ ∆i = .2 for the ’CPI Quasi-Strict Inﬂation Targeting’
7Leitemo and Söderström [2005] work with a quarterly inﬂation rate. By contrast, we
work with an annualized inﬂation rate. For consistency, we rescaled their Phillips curve
coeﬃcients by multiplying them by 4.
8regime (Loss function [12]).8
Table 2 collects the numerically computed coeﬃcients of the optimal
’targeting’ rules it = e fregime1x1t and it = e fregime2x1t. As expected, huge
diﬀerences between the two optimal rules arise. In particular, the central
bank attributes a large importance to the elements entering the UIP condi-
tion under the ﬁrst regime; by contrast, domestic elements play a key-role
when a ’CPI inﬂation targeting’ is implemented. Notably, the regime-shift
also leads to a higher optimal interest rate smoothing, given the higher con-
cern toward inﬂation stabilization under discretion (Woodford [2003]).
[Tables 1-2 here]
3 Assessing the importance of the Lucas critique
In our ’in-lab’ exercise we concentrate on the stability of two diﬀerent









(γπjπt−j + γyjyt−j + γqjqt−j + γijit−j + γi∗ji∗
t−j)+f ξπ
t (14)
Eq. (13) embeds all and no more than the variables present in the
structural Phillips curve (1), and it is intended to capture its dynamics in
a backward-looking fashion.9 This is nothing but an open-economy version
8T h em o d e l si st h o u g h tf o r’ r e p l i c a t i n g ’q u arterly dynamics. All the variables are in
log-deviations with respect to their steady states, which are normalized to zero. The
timing of the model goes as follows: at the beginning of the t
th-period, shocks strike the
economy; then, private agents form their expectations; ﬁnally, CB sets the policy rate.
The model’s impulse response functions - not presented in the text, but available upon
request - conﬁrm the dynamic sensibility of the model.
9It would be interesting to write (and estimate) the exact reduced form of the structural
inﬂation equation (1). Unfortunately, given the complicated structure of the economic
model at hand, this is not feasible. In fact, that of estimating a reduced form Phillips
curve whose coeﬃcients are complicated (and unknown) convolutions of the structural
parameters of the economy is nothing but what an econometrician working with backward
looking models typically does.
9of the one proposed by Rudebusch and Svensson [1999,2002] for the US.
Notably, with adequate restrictions on the coeﬃcients γs, this reduced-form
equation collapses to the one in Ball [1999,2000]. We label this curve as
’Phillips [1]’.
Eq. (14) enriches the former by adding both the domestic and the foreign
policy rate. This is done in order to approximate the attempt an econometri-
cian might perform for capturing important and possibly omitted dynamics
for the inﬂation rate path, or to acknowledge an explicit role to the pol-
icy rates in the inﬂation formation as in the ’cost-channel’ literature (e.g.
Ravenna and Walsh [2004]). We label the latter curve as ’Phillips [2]’.
Steps for assessing the statistical relevance of the Critique
We now turn to the description of the algorithm we employ for assessing
the statistical importance of the Lucas critique in such an open-economy
context. In particular, we implement the following steps:
1. We simulate the structural model described in Section 2 for I + T
periods under the null of absence of regime shifts. For each period of










ζ ]).10 The ﬁrst I = 100
periods are simulated to get a stochastic vector of initial values for the
model, and are discarded before implementing Step 2.
2. With this sample of pseudo-data (sample whose size is equal to T), we
OLS estimate the ’reduced form’ coeﬃcients of the backward-looking
Phillips curves (13) and (14). Then, we split the samples in two sub-
samples of equal size T1 = T2 = T
2, and compute the F-statistic of the
Chow [1960]-breakpoint test.11 We perform our exercise with samples
features by diﬀerent sizes: a ’small’ one (T = 200) and a ’large’ one
(T =1 ,000).
























T2)/(T−2k) ∼ F(k,T − 2k) under the null of stability.
103. We repeat Steps 1-2 N =3 ,000 times; each time, we store the F-
statistic computed according to Step 2.
4. The 3,000 values of the F-statistic are employed for calculating the F-
critical value for the Chow test, so obtaining the corrected-per-sample
size critical value of the test. In our exercise, we concentrate on the
statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level;
5. We implement Steps 1-3 allowing for the monetary policy regime shift
at t = T
2.12
6. We compare the 3,000 F-statistical values obtained in Step 5 with the
F-critical value computed in Step 3. In particular, if the statistical
value is larger/smaller than the critical one, the null of stability is
rejected/non rejected.13 According to this criterium, we compute a
rejection rate per each diﬀerent parameterization and sample.
The next Section presents and comments on our results.
4 Findings
To assess the stability of ’Phillips [1]’ and ’Phillips [2]’, we ﬁrst concentrate
on the rejection rates we obtained with our simulations. Two main inter-
esting considerations might be done. First, the fact that in the ’true’ model
rational expectations play a direct and indirect role in shaping the inﬂa-
tion path does not necessarily call for the instability of our reduced-form
Phillips curves under the regime-shift we simulate. In fact, Table 3 suggests
that as long as the impact of such ’forwardness’ is positive but minor - i.e.
12Notice that in moving from the ﬁrst regime to the second one we are assuming that
agents are not concerned with any learning issue; this is a limitation of our approach, and
probably renders our ’in-lab’ exercise less close to reality than a study performed with
actual data. On the other hand, this approach amplify the power of the Chow test, so
rendering its suggestions (above all those coming from large samples) more reliable.
13In fact, the ’superexogeneity test’ by Engle and Hendry [1993] would suggest to com-
pute the rejection rates conditional on the rejection of the null of stability for the monetary
policy rule. However, in this simulated exercise the break of the policy rule is a certain
and known event. This is the reason why we perform an unconditional calculation of the
rejection rates.
11when [µπ,µ y]=[ .3,.1] - the stability of ’Phillips [1]’ and ’Phillips [2]’ cannot
be rejected with a large statistical conﬁdence. But reduced-forms are not
stable in general; in fact, when the economy is quite forward-looking, their
stability is not supported by the data. Second, the Chow test is potentially
misleading in ’small’ samples. This statement is supported by the rejec-
tion rates computed for the intermediate scenario, i.e. the one identiﬁed
by [µπ,µ y]=[ .5,.3]. In particular, while the stability of the reduced-form
schedules is supported according to the rejection-rates when T = 200,t h e
opposite is suggested when the larger sample is considered. This is an inter-
esting ﬁnding, because if oﬀe r sar a t i o n a l ef o rt h eh u g ea m o u n to fe m p i r i c a l
contributions which did not oﬀer any statistical support to the Lucas critique
(see the long list of papers surveyed by Ericsson and Irons [1995], and the
recent contribution by Rudebusch [2003]). Notably, this is the very same
conclusion reached by Lindé [2001], who performed an exercise similar in
spirit but limited to a closed-economy set up. Given that the Chow [1960]
test is still widely applied in econometric applications, our evidence seems
to provide a serious warning against its use, even when the breakpoint is
known.
Our results diﬀer with respect to those in Taylor [1989]. This might
be due to the diﬀerent structure of the two ’true’ models, as well as the
diﬀerent parameterization, the magnitude of the regime-shift, and so on.
We stress here that the plus of our contribution is that of going over the
simple observation of two diﬀerent sets of estimated parameters. Indeed, we
rely on a statistical test, and we clearly put in evidence its limits in small
samples and its ability to detect instability in large samples.
[Table 3 here]
5 Robustness checks
Of course, our qualitative ﬁndings may be aﬀected by some of the choices
we made when setting up the ’true’ model of the economy. In particular,
the literature is scant on the value that the degree of ’forwardness’ µe in the
UIP equation should take. Therefore, we performed some checks along this
12dimension to verify the robustness of our results. In particular, we allowed
for the value µe = .4, lower with respect to the benchmark one, and for
a higher one, i.e. µe = .9. Figures 1 and 2 display the sensitivity of the
rejection rates to such variations. A few considerations may be put forward.
First, the function linking the rejection rates to the parameter µe seems to
be quite complex and non-linear. In particular, conditioning to a given pair
of values [µπ,µ y], we can either ﬁnd a monotonically increasing function,
or a monotonically decreasing, or a peak in correspondence to the bench-
mark value for µe. Then, from a qualitative perspective, the above men-
tioned function deserves further investigation. Second, from a quantitative
perspective the parameter µe does not really aﬀect any of the conclusions
as far as the pairs [µπ,µ y]=[ .3,.1] and [µπ,µ y]=[ .8,.8] are concerned.
By contrast, such a parameter plays an important role for the stability of
the reduced-form schedules in the intermediate case, i.e. [µπ,µ y]=[ .5,.3].
Somewhat counter-intuitively, the higher the importance of the forward-
looking term in the UIP condition, the lower the instability of the curves
’Phillips [1]’ and ’Phillips [2]’. This is an interesting result which calls for
a even more intense eﬀort towards a better understanding of the relative
importance of explicitely formalized endogenous persistence vs. forward-
looking components in both the structural version of the Phillips curve and
in the IS schedule, along the lines recently developed by Estrella and Fuhrer
[2003].
[Figures 1-2 here]
A relevant issue here is that regarding the precision of the estimated
parameters in (13) and (14). In fact, the Chow test relies upon the estimated
residuals of such schedules, then the more consistently and eﬃciently the
parameters of such schedule are estimated the more reliable the test is. Given
that we cannot compute the exact reduced-form of the structural Phillips
c u r v e( 1 ) ,w ea r en o ta w a r eo ft h ee x a c tﬁgures the estimated reduced-form
coeﬃcients should take. Nevertheless, we can at least judge the sign and
’signiﬁcance’ coming out of our econometric exercise.
13Tables 4 and 5 collect the estimated parameters and their standard de-
viations.14 As expected, the most important regressors - namely, lagged
inﬂation rates, lagged output gap observations, and lagged real exchange
rate realizations - turn out to be signiﬁcant and to have the expected posi-
tive sign. Not surprisingly, the higher the importance of the forward-looking
component in the structural Phillips curve, the lower the estimated-mean
values of the autoregressive coeﬃcients in the reduced-form schedules. Over-
all, our point-estimates seem to support the reliability of the test we em-
ployed.
[Tables 4-5 here]
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper aims at assessing the stability of reduced-form Phillips curves
in presence of a policy break in the nominal exchange-rate regime. We em-
ploy a modern new-keynesian small scale open economy dynamic stochastic
model allowing for imperfect exchange rate pass-through and endogenous
persistence in inﬂation, the output gap, and the nominal exchange rate for
simulating such policy break. Then, we estimate two reduced-from Phillips
curves and assess their stability. In most cases, their stability is rejected by
a standard Chow-test, above all when the test is run over a large sample.
However, if forward-looking expectations play a limited role in the structural
model of the economy, the stability of the reduced-from schedules is hardly
rejected. This ﬁnding seems to re-qualify the discussion on the importance
of the Lucas [1976] critique and its consequences for the use of backward-
looking schedules in monetary policy analysis. It is worth stressing that,
according to our econometric exercise, the Chow-test is not able to detect
coeﬃcients’ instability in small samples. This ﬁnding oﬀers a rationale for
the long list of contributions rejecting the importance of the Lucas critique.
14As already described when we presented our algorithm, for each reduced-form coeﬃ-
cient j we estimated 3,000 values - with 3,000 diﬀerent samples extracted from the same
population - under the policy regime shift. Tables 4 and 5 present the mean-value and the
standard deviation of each estimated parameter computed over the 3,000 point estimates
available.
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Figure 2: REJECTION RATES: SAMPLE SIZE T = 1,000.
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Table 1: BENCHMARK PARAMETRIZATION. Sources of the parameters
indicated in the text.





Regime 1 .27 .22 .85 -.06 .00 1.00 -.10 -.01 .06
Regime 2 .41 .65 .23 .01 .04 .53 .22 .11 .34
Table 2: OPTIMAL REACTION FUNCTIONS UNDER ALTERNATIVE
REGIMES. Model parameter as in the benchmark case, see Table 1.










[.3,.1] .0460 .0933 .0553 .0823
[.5,.3] .0660 .2270 .0650 .1533
[.8,.8] .4010 .9993 .3067 .9997
Table 3: PARAMETERS STABILITY: REJECTION RATES.








































































Table 4: PHILLIPS CURVE [1], PARAMETERS ESTIMATES. Note: Stan-
dard deviations - computed over 3,000 point-estimates and adjusted R2 - in
brackets.












































































































Table 5: PHILLIPS CURVE [2], PARAMETERS ESTIMATES. Note: Stan-
dard deviations - computed over 3,000 point-estimates and adjusted R2 - in
brackets.
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